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Abstract
This paper describes an adaptive agent model of rangelands based on concepts of complex
adaptive systems. The behavioural and biological processes of pastoralists, regulators, livestock,
grass and shrubs are modelled as well as the interactions between these components. The
evolution of the rangeland system is studied under different policy and institutional regimes that
affect the behaviour and learning of pastoralists, and hence the state of the ecological system.
Adaptive agent models show that effective learning and effective ecosystem management do not
necessarily coincide and can suggest potentially useful alternatives to the design of policies and
institutions.
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1. Introduction
This paper explores the widespread problem of how to avoid a long term decline in productivity
in savanna rangelands due to grazing, while still maintaining a livelihood in the short term
(Walker 1979, Tothill  and Mott 1985). We deal only with commercial systems, where changes
in vegetation structure and soils are common causes of declines in productivity.
The problem arises out of the change from the pattern of vegetation use by wild animals
dn open range under which the ecosystem evolved, to the present patterns of use on commercial
holdings. The former consisted of intermittent grazing by mobile herds, often of mixed grazers
and browsers. Grazing pressure was usually lower than now, and fires relatively frequent. The
system was adapted to rainfall that is highly variable in time and space. Under commercial
management, the pattern has changed to one of constant, heavy grazing in fenced paddocks,
often with permanent drinking water. This can lead to a reduced grass cover, little build up of
fuel and infrequent fire. Browsing animals are uncommon, ranches being stocked mainly with
sheep or cattle, both primarily grazers. Their feeding generally does not suppress shrubs.
Common consequences are an increase in woody plants, and a decline in grass production per
unit of rainfall (Stafford Smith and Pickup, 1992). These effects are recoverable to an extent,
depending on the attributes of the landscape and the reduction of grazing pressure. However,
de-stocking is expensive due to income foregone. Factors influencing range managers’ decisions
include the policy and institutional environment, and financial, forage and animal production
considerations. In this paper we focus upon interactions between the policy and institutional
environment and pastoralists’ decisions. This is because of the potential for effecting
widespread changes in range management through adaptive changes in policy and institutional
settings (Abel, 1999).
The evolution of scientific understanding and policy advice for rangelands under grazing
has progressed from a rather naive model based on linear, reversible succession (a too-literal
interpretation of Clementsian theory), through recognition of hysteresis effects in recovery from
loss of potential primary production, to the development of multiple stable state models, a
pragmatic version of which is the state-and-transition model (Westoby et al., 1989).
An approach that gives useful insights on commercial systems is optimal control theory,
in which it is assumed that the manager maximises some index of welfare (usually net income)
over a specified time under a given discount rate (eg Per-rings and Walker, 1997). The critical
assumption is that the manager is maximising a simple objective function, and is willing and able
+o adopt optimal patterns of stocking and burning.
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An alternative approach, the subject of this paper, is to consider the rangeland, the
pastoralists and the policy makers as a complex adaptive system (Holland, 1992; Abel, 1998).
Complex adaptive systems can be studied by adaptive agent models that deal with a population
of diverse and interacting agents (e.g. Janssen, 1998a; Carpenter et. al., 1999). Behavioural rules
at the level of individual agents lead to emergent properties at the macro level. Instead of
traditional deterministic equilibrium seeking models, adaptive agent models evolve, leading to
irreversible structural changes. External and internal disturbances prevent the system reaching
equilibrium.
A recent special issue of Science (April, 1999) gives an overview of disciplinary studies
of complex (adaptive) systems. In this paper an interdisciplinary, or integrated model is
discussed. Integrated models combine simplified versions of expert models of various disciplines
(Janssen, 1998b). They combine social, economic and ecological sub-systems. One purpose of
integrated models is to develop principles for managing and adapting to real complex systems.
Our rangeland model consists of ecological and socio-economic sub-systems. The
ecological sub-system is a simplified version of more comprehensive models. Relations are
empirically based. The socio-economic sub-system describes the “regulator” and the behaviour
of pastoralists. The regulator comprises the policy and institutional environment within which
pastoralists make management decisions. The socio-economic sub-system is based on theory
and evidence from psychology (Abel et al., 1998; Jager et al., 1999),  cultural anthropology
(Thompson et al., 1990; Janssen and de Vries, 1998),  economics (Ellis, 1988; Simon, 1947),  and
organisation and management (Roe et al., 1998; Sandford, 1983). Its political-economic
background is in Abel, 1999.
Potential decision rules for pastoralists were developed in discussion with experts on
rangeland management and simplified for the model. Both the decision-making environment
and the pastoralists’ decision rules necessarily lack the complexities of real systems. We believe
they retain sufficient complexity for the purposes of this paper, which are to:
0 study patterns and emergent properties arising from interactions between the simple decision
rules of policy makers and pastoralists and the dynamics of the rangeland;
l track and explain the evolution of simulated populations of pastoralists and the condition of
the range under different regulatory regimes;
l contribute to the development of general principles about management and adaptation in
ecosystems.
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The paper has four parts: 1) a model of the ecological system, 2) an account of the social and
economic system, 3) a description of the overall model and the results of a number of
‘experiments’ using the model, 4) a final section on the insights gained and the implications for
further work.
2. The Ecological System
2.1 Model Description
Essential biophysical variables and their interactions, depicted in Fig 1, are sheep, grasses and
woody plants. The model includes one hundred management units (pastoral properties, or
ranches) which can be in one of two kinds of land system (Speight, 1988; Walker, 1991). Half
the properties are in a land system with massive red earth soils prone to erosion and surface
sealing and supporting grasses and mainly inedible or inaccessible woody plants. This is
referred to as the ‘mulga’  (Acacia anew-a) land system. The other half are in a drier, more
calcareous land system with edible, chenopod dwarf shrubs and grasses. The biophysical model
is based on Perrings  and Walker (1997),  Ludwig et al (1997) and Moore et al. (1997). It takes
into  account the growth of grass and woody plants in response to rainfall, and the effects of fire,
grazing and browsing. The rates of grass and woody growth are modified by competition
between themselves and each other. Smaller, younger woody plants have a greater inhibitive
effect on grass growth per unit of woody plant biomass than do larger, older woody plants. To
capture the essential dynamics of the system over time, including lag effects, a number of
ecological processes are included. It is this set of interacting processes that gives each rangeland
its characteristic behaviour, and it is what managers must manage. The processes are:
1 . Reduction and recovery of potential primary production.
Change in the productive potential of the rangeland is reflected as a change in maximum possible
grass production. Grass growth in response to a unit of rainfall is a function of the ecological
state of the system, which is determined in this model by grass biomass itself. If, through heavy
grazing, drought or a combination of the two, grass biomass remains below some minimum
threshold level for more than one year, there is a decline in potential production (through
reduced water infiltration and loss of perennial grasses). The process is represented by a
progressive reduction in the maximum potential grass biomass (gmaX)  down to some minimum
proportion of this value (O-l) depending on the kind of rangeland. Removing grazing pressure
after potential primary production has been reduced allows the system to recover, and potential
production to increase gradually. The extent and rate of reduced potential primary production as
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well as the recovery rate (with recovery being generally slower than reduction) are determined
by the kind of land system. For the purposes of our model we equate the changes in the
parameter ‘q’ with the loss and re-establishment of the spatial processes described in Tongway
and Ludwig 1997. The actual spatial dynamics of run-off, run-on and soil nutrient status that
underlie the net effect are much more complex than our model allows.
2 . Changes in woody plant density and biomass.
50th  the biomass and density (number per unit area) of woody plants are important in the
dynamics of the rangeland. We need biomass to calculate browse and the densities of plants in
various age classes in order to capture the time course of shrub encroachment and its effects on
grass growth. Woody plants are determined initially in terms of density, calculated for four age
classes - seedlings, establishing young plants within the grass layer, middle aged and old shrubs.
For all but the seedling age class there is a mortality factor dependent on the amount of woody
leaf browsed, rainfall and fire. Individuals move through these age classes with seedlings
germinating when rainfall is above a threshold. Establishment of germinated seedlings also
depends on the amount of competition from grass and existing woody plants. Leaf biomass is
determined from a regression equation averaged for eight shrub species, relating shrub height to
leaf biomass (Harrington,  1979). Seedling contribution to total woody leaf is negligible and
ignored.
The intensity of the fire is dependent on the fuel load. The decision to bum is driven by
the density of shrubs in the establishing age class and the fuel load at which a pastoralist is
prepared to bum. Fuel load is the grass biomass remaining after grazing. It can accumulate to a
maximum level, beyond which decomposition more than offsets the rate of accumulation. In the
event of a fire the fuel load is removed, grass biomass reduced and shrubs are thinned
differentially depending upon their age class and the intensity of the fire.
3 . Livestock and wool dynamics.
The number of sheep changes through births, deaths, sales and purchases. We exclude additional
grazing pressure from wild or feral animals (eg kangaroos, goats). Sales and purchases are dealt
with in the next section. Mortality and natality are linear functions of the amount of grass and
woody browse available for consumption. As forage increases above the amount required to
maintain an animal, the growth rate increases to a maximum level. Likewise when forage falls
below that required to maintain an animal, death occurs and increases to a maximum rate.
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Forage consumption per head of sheep is a constant. We do not include mortalities due to
factors other than forage.
Potential wool production declines linearly when green leaf biomass falls below a
threshold of 75kg/ha  (Freudenberger, 1999). For this model we assume, first, that the livestock
produced or bought in the current year do not contribute to that year’s wool yield and, second,
that all leaf is green and includes (by definition) that available as woody browse. Note that only
chenopod browse is available.
proauct ion - 2  -r-w
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Figure 1. Relationships amongst the main variables in the ecological system.
2.2 Model equations
The equations for change in the four state variables, grass biomass (g), density of woody
vegetation (4, leaf biomass of woody vegetation (w) and livestock (x)  are as follows:
&t+l  - git = P l Vi? l git (I -Cgg ‘git  /(g-i  -q(git))-C,git  ~J%naxi  )- j&t P brit  H&t ) %it (1)
where:
git=  grass biomass for property i at time t, ’
p = the rate of regeneration of grasses at time t,
Vi?=  rainfall modifier coefficient [min((l3C;:,-I00)  /500,1) Q$  = rainfall for property i at time t],
% = intraspecific competition between grasses,
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g IMXi
= maximum potentia1
q(git) = reduction in gmax = adit-(g,axi - PiX,aXi  >
where:
grass biomass for property i,
adit = the accumulating reduction in potential maximum grass biomass can increase to a
maximum of 1 or decline towards 0 depending upon: adltt+l)-  adit = rredi.kit  - rr,,i.(I-kit)
and:
rred  i = reduction rate for property i (constant)
kit  = 0 (normally) or 1, when grass biomass falls below a threshold value (gd) for two
consecutive years for property i at time t,
Get  i = recovery rate for property i (constant),
pi=  proportion by which gmax can be reduced when potential primary production is at its
minimum for property i,
cwgi, = competition coefficient for the effect of w on g for property i at time t
= (%,, -Cwgtin)*kdiht/  idi/tt  +cwg
h=2 h=2
min
and:
Cwg,, = maximum w/g competition coefficient
cwmin = minimum w/g competition coefficient
d iht = density of woody plants for property in height class h (for h = 2-4) at time t calculated
as:
d ih(t+l)  - d iht = d Ii(h-l)t  &h-1 - dihhh l diht - mit  g d’ht  - fh git( > (2)
where:
aih = average time of woody plants for property i in age class h.
mit = mortality rate of woody plants as a function of browsing and rainfall for property i at time t
=I-(m-=min(~~~~~~ught,  l)(l’@~ip/Wi&  f%zax  -1)
and:
mmcrx  = maximum mortality rate for woody plants
rj&OU@=  rainfall below which mortality of woody plants will occur.
brit = woody leaf biomass browsed on property i at time t =
fin(x,,.cf*  (e, l wit hg,, + ei l w,)>,& l Wit)
and:
xii = livestock density on property i at time t:
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Xit+l - Xit =a.xit(l-(y(git,b~t)+br;.t)/(git  +bct))-k*xit  +uit (3)
where:
a = the maximum growth rate
flgil,brit)  = grass biomass removed by grazing as a function of grass biomass and browsing
= xit .cf  - br;:t
and:
cf = grass/browse consumed per head of livestock,
k = maximum death rate of the herd,
Uit = herd offtake/addition for property i at time t determined from the socio-economic model,
8i = percentage of woody leaf available as browse for property i,
Wit = total woody leaf biomass for property i at time t calculated as:
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wit  = Ce - 2.254 + 2.551 In(h&) dihr.
h=2
(4)
where:
hgtih  = average height for property i, of woody age class h,
fh(git)=  the rate of depletion of woody plants due to fire for property i in height class h at time t =
fin(o~5*~h=zit/  gmax  ,ah)*Zdit
and:
ah = maximum proportion of woody density destroyed by fire in height class h,
lit = fuel load for property i at time t where: lit+1 -  lit = g, -  y(g, , by,,  ) - Idit  l lit
Zdit  = fire decision for property i at time t determined from the socio-economic model
d ilt = density of germinating woody plants for property i, for age/height class 1 at time t
calculated as:
where:
& it = switch for germination for property i at time t, set to 1 when rainfall is above a threshold
value (rg) otherwise 0 (no germination)
cW,=  intraspecific competition between shrubs
W . =maximum  woody leaf biomass for pastoralist i,muxl
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cgw=  competition between grasses and shrubs
d& maximum number of seedlings
b&)  = rate of depletion of grasses due to fire at time t, b(g,) = o.ldi,
where:
o= proporti on of grass biomass destroyed by fire
Wool production is calculated as:
where:
wpit  = wool production for property i at time t,.
q~-=  annual average greasy wool production per sheep.
wm(git,wit)  = wool production modifier which is set to 1 when available forage (git+O.Wit)  is
greater than 75kg, otherwise = O.O053.(g,  + Bi .W,  ) + 0.6
1 0
The initial and maximum values of the state values, and the parameter values in the example are
presented in Table 1.
Table 1 Parameter values of the ecological model.
Mulga (i=l-50) Chenopod (i= 51-100) all pastoralists (i=l- 100)
g-=  800 8 max= 600 xi0 = 0.1 d ma= 5000
wm,=  3000 Wn*aJ  = 1000 gio = 400 (T  = 0.2
y,,d  = 0.015 rred  = 0.01 djh0 =o,  l~~o,looo,  100 aih=l,5,20,24
rrec  = 0.01 r ret  , = 0.01 adio  = 0 mnzax = 02 9
gd = 100 gd=50 1 i0 = 0 cf drought = 200
p = 0.2 p = 0.6 p=3 a = 0.3
rg  = 500 rg  = 400 egg  = 1 k=O.l
hgt;!  = 1 hgtz  - -. 5 cgw = 0.8 cf= 400
hgt3  = 2 hgt3  - - 1 OtW=l mh=  0,0.9,0.8,0.6
hgt4  = 3 hgt4  - - 15 . CWgmin  = . 6 Wpmax = 6
8=0 8 = 0.5 cwg-  = .8
1 1
Figures 2 and 3 present the results of 200 year simulations of the ecological model for the mulga
and chenopod rangelands, under two extremes of management - a very light grazing pressure,
and a heavy grazing pressure induced by maximum stocking rates.
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Fig 2. Grass and woody leaf biomass at a low stocking rate with (a) and without (b) fire.
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3. The Socio-Economic System
3.1 Introduction
Social science theory dealing with decision making is divided by scale and discipline.
Psychology addresses personal decisions, anthropology operates at cultural level, sociology is
concerned with whole societies, while neo-classical economics deals with economies as if these
are separated from society. Linkages between disciplines and scales are at best weak. Thus neo-
classical economics uses utility-maximising models that are contradicted by empirical studies of
decision making (Simon, 1957; Ormerod, 1994; Thaler, 1994; Loomes, 1998). In these
circumstances we used elements of social science we thought important for our purposes, and
which can be included in a formal model. Although formal models cannot include behaviour
that approaches the sophistication or subtlety of decisions made by real people, they are clear in
their assumptions and the resulting consequences.
Social scientists have used computers to simulate behavioural and social processes since
the early 1950’s. They are now exploring new ways of modelling human behaviour with
techniques such as cellular automata, genetic algorithms and neural networks (Vallacher and
Nowak 1994; Gilbert and Doran 1994; Gilbert and Conte 1995; Conte et al. 1997 and Liebrand
et al. 1998). The general feature of this new work is the use of simulation models of interacting
agents to study social processes in simple and complex environments.
3.2 Model desciption
Two levels of social behaviour are distinguished, at two different spatial scales: the pastoralists
who manage their own land, and a regulator who attempts to influence the behaviour of all the
pastoralists in the region.
The pastoralists
The behaviour of pastoralists is based on theories and modeling approaches from bounded
rationality (Simon, 1957, 1996),  social psychology (Jager et al. 1999),  and mental models (Abel
et al., 1998). Decision rules were drawn from empirical and modelling studies (Carman et al.,
1998, Foran and Stafford Smith, 1991; Noble; 1997; Hodgkinson and Marsden,  1999; Buxton
and Stafford Smith, 1996),  and interviews with knowledgeable professionals from CSIRO
Wildlife and Ecology.
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The population of one hundred pastoralists differ in their financial and cognitive abilities, their
perception of time, and in the utility they derive from consumption. Both commercial and life
style pastoralists can have long or short time horizons. Those with long time horizons pay more
attention to the quality of the rangeland compared to those with a short time horizon. One type
of pastoralist is assumed to reach a given level of utility with a relatively low consumption level.
They choose to live in the rangeland because they enjoy the lifestyle. The other type, the
commercial pastoralist, is motivated purely by the financial returns from the land. We
acknowledge that this is a great simplification, and that many of the factors that we know drive
behaviour are omitted (family size, skill levels, school fees, external income and so on). The
level of simplification is appropriate for our purposes.
To determine the level of consumption we take into account pastoralists’ financial
resources and utility functions, as related to life style. Financial resources in any year comprise
net income for that year plus any surplus carried forward from the previous year. We assume
that a pastoralist consumes a minimum amount that leads to a minimum level of utility Uen.
When financial resources are above this minimum level, utility rises with consumption. Any
financial resources above a certain level (Rmax) ($/ha), are consumed and increase utility.
The utility function, Ui,  of pastoralist i is therefore:
(7)
with
Ci=max(exp(Ue,)“ai,  cf,i *  inci,  Ri,t  - R,,)
where consumption is denoted by C ($/ha/yr),  and parameter a determines the degree of
satisfaction per unit of consumption. Ri ($/ha) is the financial resources (cash held) of pastoralist
i, in a particular year; cr i,7 consumption rate, is the percentage of the yearly income. An amount
1-cri,  is carried forward to the next year to contribute to financial resources. The term inci7
($/ha/yr)  is yearly gross margin from sale of products. Depreciation and fixed costs are ignored.
Financial resources change due to revenue from wool, sheep purchases and sales, debt
repayments and consumption. Due to uncertainties in rainfall, grass biomass, wool price, and
growth of the sheep flock actual income may differ significantly from expected income.
Pastoralists may have debt repayments, dbi,  and this debt increases when financial resources are
negative, in line with the interest rate, int. A pastoralist may decide to buy sheep for the price of
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psb  each if the actual stocking level xi is not equal to the expected stocking level E[xi]t. The
pastoralist may also sell surplus sheep at a price pss  (<p&)  ($/sheep) each if the property or the
sheep are in poor condition.
The net income, Inci, is defined as
Inci = xi,t*wp,,*pwt  - (dbi  t -, int*fin(o&t-1)) - max(O,xi,t”E[xi],)*p,b+max(O,  -E[xilt+xi,t)*pss  (8)
Where: x is the stocking rate; wpmaX the amount of wool yield per sheep (kg); and pw is the wool
price (per kg) minus the variable costs of production, (per kg). Net income, savings brought
forward and consumption constitute financial resources.
Ri t = Ri i-1, 7 + inci - Ci
The expected stocking level of sheep at the beginning of period t is the lesser of:
a the flock size resulting from natural increase
l the flock size that would consume the expected biomass of grass (g) at the specified
consumption rate per head, cf.
E[xi]  = min((l+a)* xi,t-1  ,E[gJcf) (10)
Debt repayment is assumed to be related to the interest rate, int, and the pay back period PBP
(years), and only holds when financial resources, RI, are negative. Debt payments make it
difficult for pastoralists to return to positive resources again. When negative resources fall
below a tolerable debt level Dmax, then the pastoralist is assumed to go bankrupt.
d bi,t = int/[  I-( l+int)-PBP]  *  max(O, -Ri  t 1)7- (11)
We consider two cognitive processes affecting stocking decisions. If a pastoralist is satisfied
(s)he is assumed to process information automatically and show habitual behaviour. We assume
dissatisfaction when growth rate of stock is poor, or when grass biomass or financial resources
fall below certain levels. Dissatisfaction stimulates the pastoralist to consider changing
management. The pastoralist may still be seen as an economically rational agent who does not
spend scarce time and cognitive abilities on complex problem solving when (s)he is already
satisfied (Simon, 1957). From a psychological viewpoint, the hierarchical nature of personal
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constructs mean that individuals change their minds on major matters somewhat reluctantly
(Kelly, 1955).
Decisions on stocking rate
So long as financial and ecological conditions are satisfactory, the pastoralist will continue to
stock at a rate linearly related to expected grass biomass (E(gi)) and consumption rate (cf).
The sheep graze all the allowable proportion (ms) of the expected biomass. The number of
sheep is that which fully consumes the maximum allowable proportion of grass biomass, and the
pastoralists differ with respect to their perceptions of this proportion (ms). Equations are:
Xi = ms*E[gi]/cfi (13)
E[gilt = gi,t-1  Cl+  gG,t  *( Wfl~gd)~~g) (14)
The expected rainfall, E[rfJ  (mm/yr),  is assumed to be a moving average over the last 5 years. A
refinement of the model could be the introduction of different forecasting techniques. Some
pastoralists use high tech information on weather forecasts, while other wait and see. The
parameter gr is an expected growth rate of grass as defined below.
Mental model theory proposes that because humans necessarily abstract from complex
information, mental models cannot be faithful mirrors of reality (Abel, 1998). Pastoralists’
mental models were therefore constructed for our simulation so they had imperfect
understanding. Theory also predicts that changes in mental models to accommodate
contradictions between the mental model and incoming information are made somewhat
reluctantly (Kelly, 1955). Therefore a pastoralist will only update his or her mental model as
defined below if dissatisfaction with financial or ecological conditions exceeds a threshold. If
dissatisfied by range condition, they will reduce stocking rate. We simulate destocking  by
assuming another parameterization of the linear relation, where ds c ms.
xi = ds*E[gi]/cfi (1%
If the pastoralist is dissatisfied because of negative financial resources, (s)he uses the ms-
equation for the stocking rate. If both the financial and the ecological conditions are poor, the
financial situation is assumed to take priority.
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Fire management
On mulga rangelands, pastoralists bum when the amount of young woody weeds (yww) exceeds
a certain threshold level yww (kg/ha), and when enough fuel ( grass), is available. The threshold
level yww is an individual characteristic of the pastoralist representing his or her understanding
of fire management. Pastoralists who never use fire, because of its effect on short-term pasture
availability, hence income, have high thresholds. Pastoralists who use fire intensively to reduce
woody weeds have low thresholds.
Updating mental models
?astoralists who are financially or ecologically dissatisfied seek new ways of increasing utility
and are assumed to update their mental models. Values of parameters in the pastoralists’ mental
models of the rangeland system are modified accordingly. The parameter gri t denotes the -,
expected growth rate of grass in relation to rainfall, assuming constant competition from shrubs.
According to the mental model, the expected grass growth does not change through small
changes in shrubs.
To determine the growth rate of grass in the mental model, we first assume that no burning
occurs and that grazing is zero. Then we can write grass biomass g (kg/ha) as a function of the
biomass of the previous period plus grass growth Ag
gi,t  = gi,t-1  + &i t? (16)
where grass growth is dependent on grass biomass, the actual rainfall, rfit , and a number of
parameters and variables related to shrub dynamics and potential primary production.
Ag = gi,t-1  p vi,t (l-c,,  gmax - Cwg Wmax) (17)
We now can rewrite grass biomass as
git  = &t-l (l+Vi,t  p (l-Cm &nax - Cwg Wmax))bb (18)
we assume now that gr= p (l-c,, gmx - cwg wmax)  which can be assumed to be constant in the
mental model of the pastoralist, which is now:
&t = &t-l * (1 + gr *E[vitl)* (19)
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The expected rainfall modifier value depends on the expected rainfall, which is an average value
of an historical record, say 5 years. Note that grass growth in reality follows equation 18, where
the competition effect of woody weed on grass is variable as defined in the ecological model.
The grass growth in the mental model is determined using expected rainfall instead of actual
rainfall (eq. 19),  and a constant value of the competition effect from the last update  of the mental
model.
“Renewal” of pastoralists
If the financial resources of a pastoralist drop below a certain threshold value D,,  , the
maximum tolerable debt level, we assume the pastoralist goes bankrupt and leaves the system.
The land may be acquired by a pastoralist already in the system, or by a new pastoralist with a
random set of cognitive characteristics. We assume that the higher the financial resources of a
particular pastoralist, the higher the chance that the renewed agent has the same characteristics as
the “fittest” pastoralist, otherwise a new pastoralist with random characteristics is chosen. This
is implemented as in the following equation
IF mhnin 9 umJ<LN(MAX(Ri))  THEN characteristics of “fittest” existing pastoralist ELSE
random new characteristics (20)
This says that when a random number drawn from a uniform distribution U[] is lower than the
natural logarithm of the maximum of all resources, the characteristics of the fittest pastoralists,
that is the pastoralist with the highest amount of resources, is copied to replace the pastoralist
who went bankrupt. Otherwise the new pastoralist has parameters of the behavioural model that
are drawn randomly. An increase of the highest amount of resource leads to an increase, at a
decreasing rate, of the chance of copying, and a lower chance of introducing new behavioural
patterns.
This algorithm has some similarities with genetic algorithms (Goldberg, 1989; Holland,
1992; Mitchell, 1996). Genetic algorithms simulate the adaptive processes of natural systems.
They have a population of agents who produce offspring that are similar but not identical to their
parents. The number of offspring that an agent produces is determined by a fitness function. In
our model, the “fitness” of the pastoralists is related to their financial stock. If it becomes too
low the pastoralist “dies”. If other pastoralists are “fit” enough the fittest acquires the land,
otherwise a random new pastoralist comes into the system which may bring in a new
management style. This process will lead to an evolution of the characteristics of the
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pastoralists. Given the social and physical environmental conditions pastoralists with certain
characteristics will come to dominate during the simulation. A key question in this regard is;
which characteristics dominate under which types of social and physical environmental
conditions? An important variable in the social environment of the pastoralists is the type of
regulation policy.
The regulator
The regulator in our model is a very simple representation of government. In line with the
notion of different cultural perspectives (Schwartz and Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990;
Rayner, 1990),  we distinguish three different types of regulator: conservation, stabilisation and
free market. A change in “regulator” may in reality reflect a change in policy style, rather than an
actual change in the administration.
A conservation policy aims to protect the ecosystem from negative influences of human
activities. We assume that this policy causes pastoralists to destock their property when the
grass biomass falls below a certain threshold (say 150 kg/ha).
The stabilization type of policy tries to maximize the long-term welfare of society by balancing
range condition with income. If rainfall drops below 200 mm in a year, all pastoralists receive a
grant of { (ms-ds)*E[gr]/cf } * 15$/ha provided they (partly) destock.
The free market policy does not intervene, leaving pastoralists responsible for managing land in
good and bad times.
3.3 Change of regulation policy
Abel (1999) discussed regional, state and national influences on policies and institutions
affecting these rangelands. These complexities are not included here. Instead we explored
interactions among rangelands, pastoralists and regulators on the assumption that the conditions
of rangelands and pastoralists were the sole determinants of policy style. Similar experiments
have been performed for climate change (Janssen, 1998b; Janssen and de Vries, 1998) and lake
eutrophication (Janssen and Carpenter, 1999). We define thresholds which, when exceeded, lead
to a change in regulation. The first is related to opportunity cost expressed as the amount of
Income per ha that could be earned at a stocking rate at which all grass is eaten. Wool price also
determines this opportunity cost. The second threshold is related to ecological condition, the
percentage of properties which have a grass biomass below a minimum amount of 200 kg/ha for
mulga, and 150 kg/ha for chenopod.
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For each type of regulation we defined conditions in which the regulator maintains or changes
policy.
The conservation policy aims at maintaining the initial state of the environment which
was “good”. If the percentage of properties in good condition remains below 60%,  the
conservation policy continues. If the percentage of properties in good condition rises above 60%
policies change. The free market policy is adopted when opportunity cost is more than 2$/ha.  If
this cost is less, a stability policy of policy is applied.
If the free market policy is already in effect, it continues a free market regulation when
the so long as opportunity cost is more than l$/ha.  Otherwise one of the other policies is
adopted. A conservation policy is adopted if the percentage of properties in good condition is
below 60%,  otherwise stability policies are employed.
If a stability policy is in force, it continues as long as no extreme circumstances occur. It
changes to conservation when the percentage of properties in good condition drops below 50%,
or to free market when the lost opportunities are above 2$/ha.
4. Results
4.1 Introduction
In this section we describe a number of experiments. First, we determine the optimal values of
the behavioural rules for a one-property system. Then we analyse the social, economic and
ecological consequences of applying each policy style during runs in which the style does not
change in response to changing conditions. Next we run experiments in which the policy style
changes according to the rules described above.
Historical yearly median rainfall and wool price data from 1986 to 1997 are used for each
rangeland. Wool prices are in real terms. Our data cover only the last century. As the model
runs are 200 years, rainfall and wool price data are repeated, but a price peak caused by the
Korean War (1950s) was removed from the first 100 years (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Rainfall and wool prices used for all simulations.
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4.2 Optimal management strategies
Given that rainfall and wool prices are known for the 200-year period, what parameter values
maximise the (discounted) net income stream? The non-linear optimisation problem is solved by
the standard optimisation algorithm (Powell algorithm) in the Vensim software, the package in
which this model has been implemented (Ventana, 1998). Because of complexity and non-
iinearity, we used a large number of starting points for the runs (200) for a single property in
each of the mulga and chenopod rangelands, and the best solutions are given in Table 2.
In general, short periods of intensive stocking, followed by a period of recovery
characterise the optimal solutions. This flip-flop behaviour of stocking is most extreme for the
chenopod type of property, because mulga is more sensitive to intensive grazing, which leads to
shrub increase and reduced potential primary production. The a values are low for mulga, which
means pastoralists are mainly commercial (high minimum consumption level). The high savings
rate, l-c,, and the frequent use of fire suggest a long time horizon during decision making. The
chenopod rangeland case is different. The low cc  value combined with a low savings rate
suggests a lifestyle pastoralist with a short time horizon.
The stocking rate, grass biomass and income from mulga rangeland are about twice
those from the chenopod type. In the optimal case, the pastoralist burns about once a decade in
the mulga type.
Figures 5 and 6 depict the yearly income, grass biomass and shrub biomass for the
optimal case. The periodic flipping of high and low stocking leads to huge variation in yearly
income and grass biomass. On mulga rangeland, burning limits woody growth. On chenopod
rangeland, shrubs have natural patterns of growth and decline.
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Table 2: Optimal parameter values of the behavioural rules, using 200 starting points. Ms is the
share of expected available grass biomass to be consumed by the sheep when enough grass
biomass is available, otherwise a lower share, ds, is used. Grass biomassen  is the threshold that
marks the line between good and bad condition of rangeland. Natural growth,, is the threshold
that marks the line between good and bad condition of livestock. The % consumption of income
is denoted by cf. The parameter of the utility function leading to a minimum level of
consumption is a. Ywwfin is the threshold of young woody weeds above which the pastoralist
bums to control shrubs.
ms
d s
Grass biomassAn
Natural growthi,
cr
a
pWlliIl
Mean stocking rate
M e a n  b i o m a s sgrass
Mean woody weed
Mean income
Mean reduction in ppp*
Number of fires
* ppp = potential primary production
Mulga
0.801
0.03
4 7 5
0 . 1 9 4
0 . 1 7 2
2 . 6 4
1193
0 . 5 2
511
2 0 5
16.03
0 0.
2 2
Chenopod
1 .ooo
0 . 0 0 0
1 0 4
0 . 1 3
0 . 6 9
9 . 6 0
X
0 . 2 5
1 8 0
2 0 3
8 . 4 0
0.0002
X
2 4
years
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
years
Figure 5: Income, grass biomass and woody weed developments for the mulga type rangeland.
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Zgure 6: Net Income, grass biomass and shrub biomass, chenopod rangeland.
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As an additional experiment, we repeated the previous optimisation runs, but used a discount rate
of 5% on the yearly net income instead of the 0% discount rate of the previous exercise. The
stocking rate is even more unstable, varying to an extreme between zero and a rate at which all
grass is consumed. The threshold of grass biomass that determines the change from or to
destocking is lower when returns are discounted, so destocking occurs at lower sheep densities.
The threshold for fire management is higher so there is less burning. Pastoralists have lower-
income levels but consume almost their whole income (high cT  values). The discounted income
is only slightly lower for the chenopod case, but significantly lower for the mulga type of
rangeland. In the case of mulga, the grass biomass is much lower, and the woody weed is much
higher than the same indicators in Table 2. Moreover, potential primary production is reduced.
Table 3: Optimal settings behavioural rules when maximising income with a discount rate of 5%
ms
d s
Grass biomasstin
Natural growth,,
Cr
a
pWllitl
Mean stocking rate
M e a n  b i o m a s sgrass
Mean woody weed
Mean income
Mean reduction in p p p
Number of fires
Mulga Chenopod
0 . 9 9 9 1 .ooo
0 . 0 0 0 0.000
4 0 1 1 0 2
0 . 0 9 0 . 1 9
0.98 0 . 8 2
8.89 7 . 6 8
1972 X
0.51 0.24
4 3 0 177
4 1 7 2 1 5
11.46 8 . 3 6
0.003 0.0002
1 8 X
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4.3 System dynamics under diflerent forms of regulation
Ln the optimisation experiments perfect foresight was assumed. In this section we use the
adaptive rules. Initially, behavioural rules are distributed randomly among pastoralists.
Unexpected changes in rainfall and wool prices cause some pastoralists to go bankrupt. They are
replaced by new pastoralists as described earlier. After 200 years we derive a population of
pastoralists who performed well in the face of uncertainty.
To explore the effects of regulation policy on rangeland and the evolution of pastoralists
we ran 3 experiments, one for each policy type, each with 100 properties: 50 mulga, 50
chenopod. Each experiment was run 100 times with random new initial parameter values of the
behavioural rules. A weighted average parameter value of the 100 runs was calculated for
properties on each range type (Table 4). The level of the financial resources weights the
parameter values of the pastoralists. The more successful a pastoralist, the more his/her
parameter values are weighted. This weighting of properties is necessary to weight the success
of different type of pastoralists under different policies. By weighting the parameter values of
+he  behavioural model according to the resources of the pastoralists, an indication of thew
parameter values of a successful pastoralists can be derived.
Chenopod rangeland allows higher values of ms and ds, and switching to destocking at a
lower level of grass biomass. The pastoralists all have a low minimum amount of consumption,
and save about 60% of income when it exceeds the minimum consumption level. Because the
survival of the pastoralists depends on their long-term financial resources, big spenders drop out
quickly in bad years, leading to a rapid increase of the average a value during the first decades
of the simulation.
The differences in parameter values between the different types of regulator seem
modest. Under a conservation regime (obligatory destocking), the levels of ms and ds are
somewhat higher for mulga compared to the other two regimes. Also, destocking starts at a
lower level of grass biomass. If we view the state of the rangelands during the 200.year  period,
bigger differences occur (Table 5). For the mulga case, stocking rates and income levels are
much higher under a conservation regime, compared to free market and stability policy styles.
Woody weed and reduced levels of potential primary production are on average much lower.
The conservation policy outperforms the other two types of regulation on these criteria. On
chenopod rangeland a stability regime is preferred since it derived extra income from drought
relief for destocking, although the system is robust enough to cope with drought years. The
condition of the chenopod rangeland does not differ significantly between the different types of
regulation.
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Table 4: The parameter values of the behavioural rules that evolve after 200 years. The
parameter values are the average value over 100 runs of the weighted average pastoralist for each
run.
initial Mulga Chenopod
Free Stability Conservation Free Stability Conservation
Market Market
ms 0.2-1.0 0.51 0 . 5 4 0 . 5 9 0 . 6 4 0 . 6 6 0 . 6 3
ds 0.0-0.2 0.11 0.11 0.13 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 5
Gb min 100-400 2 4 8 2 5 4 2 3 6 2 2 2 2 3 9 2 2 7
%  mill o-o.3 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0 0.18 0 . 1 7 0 . 1 8 0 . 1 7
Cr 0.2-0.6 0 . 4 0 0 . 4 0 0.37 0 . 3 8 0.39 0 . 3 6
a 2.510 8.18 8.12 8.27 8.28 8.03 8.39
ywwmin  100 - 1676 1754 1597 X X X
4 0 0 0
Table 5: Statistics of the average condition of the rangeland over the 200-year period. The
“death rate” is the average % of bankruptcy per year.
Mulga Chenopod
Free Stability Conservation Free Stability Conservation
Market Market
Mean stocking rate 0.21 0.21 0 . 3 2 0.21 0.21 0 . 2 0
M e a n  b i o m a s sgrass 2 0 9 2 1 8 3 4 0 2 2 0 2 3 1 2 4 2
Mean woody weed 1625 1601 1065 1 8 0 178 176
Mean income 5 . 4 2 5 . 9 6 8.72 5 . 7 8 6.71 5.61
Mean drought relief x 0 . 4 0 X X 1.07 X
Mean reduction in 0 . 3 3 5 0 . 3 0 8 0.018 0 . 0 0 3 0.002 0.001
PPP
Number of fires 4 9. 4 9  . 6 6. X X X
“Death rate” 80/  0 7Y  0 lo/ 0 0 . 5 % 0.3% 0 . 7 %
1
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To measure the effectiveness of the learning process the parameter values of Table 4 are used as
input for a 200 yr run of a one-property model under the three different types of regulation
(Table 6). For mulga, the pastoralist who evolves under a free market regulation leads in general
to the highest net income, and good range condition. Net income is somewhat less under a
stability regime, where a significant part of income is from drought relief. Surprisingly, net
income is much less under a conservation policy, and range condition is worse compared to the
other two regimes, with less grass and more woody weed. This can be explained by the higher
intensity of stocking which reduced the grass biomass. For chenopod rangeland, the stabilization
type of regulation leads to the highest income levels, although the differences between policies
are smaller than those for the mulga.
Why does the conservation policy favour the evolution of pastoralists who perform worse
than those who evolved under free markets? This can be explained by the fact that obligatory
destocking reduces the learning potential of the pastoralists. Pastoralists who follow a risky
stocking strategy do not “survive” under a free market. They do survive under the conservation
policy, whose obligatory destocking policy reduces the chance of destroying the property.
However, the free market policy leads to better performing pastoralists, condition of the rangland
is worse during the learning period compared to the conservation policy.
The stabilisation policy also reduced learning, but not as much as obligatory destocking.
However, a drought relief policy does not improve the condition of the rangeland during the 200
years as compared to the free market regime.
These results lead to the question of what type of policy and institutional environment
permits or stimulates learning while maintaining rangeland condition during the learning
process. We explore this question in the next section where we let the style of policy change
over time.
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Table 6: Performance of the weighted average pastoralist who evolved after 200 years when
subsequently entered in a one-property model for a simulation of 200 years.
Average net income Regulator to test performance of evolved pastoralist
Mulga Free Market Stability Conservation
Regulator during Free Market 12.76 13.35 (0.59) 11.10
initial 200 year Stability 10.71 11.25 (0.54) 11.23
experiment Conservation 5 . 7 0 6 . 1 6 (0.45) 8.34
Average net income
,
Regulator to test performance of evolved pastoralist
Chenopod Free Market Stability Conservation
Regulator during Free Market 6 . 0 6 6.90 (0.85) 5 . 7 4
initial 200 year Stability 6.21 7.36 (1.14) 5 . 9 6
experiment Conservation I 5 . 9 9 I 6.90 (0.90) I 6 . 0 0
Average grass biomass (kg/ha)
Mulga
Regulator to test performance of evolved pastoralist
Free Market Stability Conservation
Regulator during
initial 200 year
experiment
Free Market 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 6
Stability 3 6 6 3 6 6 4 1 8
Conservation 197 197 2 7 3
Average grass biomass (kg/ha)
Chenopod
Regulator to test performance of evolved pastoralist
Free Market Stability Conservation
Regulator during
initial 200 year
Free Market 2 0 8 2 0 8 2 0 3
Stability 2 1 8 2 1 8 2 1 7
I experiment Conservation 2 1 4 I 2 1 4 I 2 1 6
Changing management styles
In simulations where the policy style of the regulators is allowed to change, each regulator is
confronted with measures of system performance. This leads to changes in regulation styles.
When the system starts under the stabilisation regulator, the high stocking rate rapidly decreases
the amount of grass biomass to such a degree that the conservation regulator takes over for a
brief period. The system recovers. Unexploited opportunities then allow the free market policy
to dominate.
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Because policy types change over time during these experiments, resulting parameter values lay
between the values that evolved under fixed policies (Tables 4 and 7). The changing regime has
less intensive stocking policies than the average pastoralist who evolved during the conservation
policy, which indicates a more sustainable management style. Moreover, the state of the
rangeland during the learning phase remains in a relative good condition (Table 8) compared to
the average value of the fixed regulator policies (Table 4).
Table 7: The parameter values of the behaviour rules that evolve after 200 years under changing
regulation policies. The parameter values are the average value over 100 runs of the weighted
average pastoralist for each run.
initial Mulga Chenopod
ms 0.2-l .o 0 . 5 5 0.64
ds 0.0-0.2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 5
Gb mill 1 0 0 - 4 0 0 2 4 9 2 3 8
Ng min o-o.3 0 . 1 9 0 . 1 8
Cr 0.2-0.6 0 . 3 9 0 . 3 8
a 2.5-10 8 . 2 4 8 . 2 0
yWbliIl  1 0 0 - 4 0 0 0 1658 X
Table 8: Statistics of the average condition of the rangeland over the 200 year period for
changing regulation policies
Mulga Chenopod
Mean stocking rate 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 1
M e a n  b i o m a s sgrass 2 6 1 2 3 4
Mean woody weed 1415 1 7 7
Mean income 6.91 6 . 1 3
Mean drought relief 0.21 0 . 4 8
Mean reduction in ppp 0.204 0.002
Number of fires 5 7. X
“Death rate 57  0 0.4%
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Parameter values of Table 7 were used in a one-property analysis under different policy regimes,
each lasting 200 years. Resulting net income and grass biomass levels are presented in Table 9.
The pastoralist who evolves during changing styles of regulation leads to relatively good levels
of income and grass biomass under all three types of regulation. This example shows that an
adaptive pattern of policy style prevents extreme good and bad outcomes. On average the
income levels of Table 6 and 9, both fixed and changing regulation, are similar.
Table 9: Performance of the weighted average pastoralist who evolved after 200 years when
entered in a one-property model for a simulation of 200 years.
Changing regulation Regulator to test performance of evolved pastoralist
Mulga Free Market Stability Conservation
Average Net Income 9 . 5 9
I
10.01 (0.42) 10.69
Average grass biomass 3 0 8 3 0 8 3 8 4
Changing regulation
Chenopod
Average Net Income
Regulator to test performance of evolved pastoralist
Free Market Stability Conservation
6.08 7.16 (1.08) 5.71
Average grass biomass 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 7
5. Conclusions
The model describes the interactions between grass, trees/shrubs, sheep, pastoralists and the
policy environment. We analysed the consequences of these interactions under different policy
environments. We were particularly interested in the co-evolution of pastoralists’ management
styles and governmental policies.
The optimal control experiments show that under the assumptions of the model, including
perfect information, a strongly fluctuating stocking density leads to the best financial and
ecological consequences. It entails destocking  for just long enough to let the grass grow again
before re-stocking at a high rate. In mulga, frequently burning to reduce woody weeds
contributes to the success of the strategy. The alternating style is a consequence of the lag effects
in the ecological system.
Experiments with the adaptive agents version of the model show that each policy has
different financial and ecological consequences. Regulation reduces the learning process but
keeps the rangeland in relatively good condition while the limited learning occurs. This is
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especially true for mulga. The regulation process in the conservation regime keeps the system in
reasonably good condition during the 200-year period but the pastoralist that evolved under the
free market regime outperforms this ‘conservation’ pastoralist. The stability regime was not
successful in keeping the rangeland in good condition, and reduced the learning rate of
pastoralists. In general, the average pastoralist that evolves earns about 40% and 30% lower
income in the mulga and chenopod rangeland compared to the respective optimal solutions. This
is an estimate of the cost of managing under uncertainty and is in line with empirical case studies
McKean et al. (1998) of differences in returns from ranges in high variable climate and stable
climate conditions.
When the regulator is allowed to change there is an alternation between regulator styles
as the system agents and policies adapt to changes in grass biomass and the loss of economic
opportunities. The changes in regulation are triggered by surprises of high wool prices (the style
changes to free market) and drought periods (change to conservation). Consumption levels are
more stable in the adaptive than in the optimising model, and rangeland condition is maintained.
These results are preliminary. A program for developing the potential of this approach is likely
to include:
l modification of policy regimes to include, for example, measures for distributing benefits
and costs over time - incentives, taxation, insurance;
0 changes in the economic environment that take account of other wool price regimes and also
different interest levels;
l elaboration of management decisions to explore the influences of various levels of debt;
l modification of the biophysical sub-system to explore the effects of different rates of
recovery of potential primary production, different sensitivities to grazing pressure, etc.
Such a developed model could become a significant tool for exploring interactions between
human and ecological sub-systems for rangeland management policy. The exploratory
experiments have shown the importance of different types of policies, and the consequences of
changing the regime of policies.
The system can be confronted with many surprises, such as low wool prices, drought,
changing sheep prices, changing interest rates, and so on. This may affect the behaviour of the
pastoralists in such a way that the government has to change its regulatory procedures to allow
the pastoralists to survive. These changes in regulation should be chosen with care since they
may also reduce the ability of the pastoralists to learn, which is likely to reduce the resilience of
the system as a whole. A simulation model as discussed in this paper, which is clearly only a
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caricature of the real complex system, might nevertheless be a tool that enables us to analyse the
system characteristics of alternative management strategies. One of the big challenges of this
type of model is to design institutional regimes that balance ability to learn, returns from the
rangeland, and condition of the ecosystem.
Finally, this type of modelling may provide additional insights compared with the
optimal control models from economics, and the detailed bottom up models from ecology. It
integrates the important elements of managing real complex ecosystems. This type of modelling
therefore provides an interesting approach to the science of integration, and to the development
of promi sing management and policy strategies.
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